

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

762.00/12-1058

XR 411.6141

This Document must be Returned  
to the RMR Central Files

DATE: December 10, 1958

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Olivier Manet, Counselor, French Embassy  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR  
Mr. James H. McFarland, GER

COPIES TO: EUR - 2 (1cc)

~~US~~

BNA

EE

RA - 2

GER - 3 (2 cc)

~~IRA - 2~~

~~American Embassy - Bonn - 3~~

~~USBER Berlin~~

~~American Embassy - Paris~~

~~USRO Paris~~

~~American Embassy - London~~

~~American Embassy - Moscow~~

~~IRC - 6~~

27

Mr. Manet said he had intended to give Mr. Kohler a questionnaire for the next meeting of experts but it had been held up in Paris. It was only a framework and had no answers.

He then turned to British-Federal Republic relations and remarked that according to the press the Germans were cross with the British because Selwyn Lloyd had brought up the old Eden Plan again and the Germans did not consider themselves bound by it. He asked if Mr. Kohler knew of any other reasons for the strained relations. Mr. Kohler replied that the Germans had been very uneasy about the British "slippery slope" paper which had acquainted them for the first time with contingency plans to deal with the GDR. Then they had been made more unhappy by Lloyd's remarks in the House. These were the only factors known to him.

Adenauer had written all three of us after Khrushchev's November 10 speech. Maybe his worry about the British had prompted him to ask Macmillan to use his influence with Khrushchev in hopes of stiffening the British attitude. Macmillan had written, which we all learned about only sometime later. Mr. Kohler then referred to the revised contingency plans we hoped to send Ambassador Bruce. As soon as final agreement was reached he would let Mr. Manet have a copy.

Mr. Manet mentioned that Mr. Kohler had told him there would be a three or four

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 7 - 1959

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

no cc's rec'd in RM/R - destroyed

CONFIDENTIAL

four power meeting on this subject and asked if that was still the plan. Mr. Kohler replied that because of the time factor he would hand the French a written directive of the agreed U.S. position. He hoped Paris would instruct Ambassador Seydoux to agree to the changes.

Mr. Manet remarked that the French were not in favor of Mayor Brandt going to Paris. Mr. Kohler stated that we had concurred in our Ambassador's remarks that Brandt should go not as a representative of a "5th power" but as a member of the Federal Republic delegation. Mr. Manet stated that even with this assurance the French were not at all enthusiastic. It would give the impression he was there to exert some kind of pressure. Brandt should deal with the three powers in Berlin. Mr. Kohler said the United States was thinking in terms of bringing the Germans into the picture more than in 1948. It was important to keep up the morale of the Berliners. Mr. Manet asked if Mr. Kohler thought the Chancellor would be pleased. Mr. Kohler replied that Adenauer would not necessarily be happy about it but that was a German problem. There were some differences between Adenauer and Brandt. The latter should not come as an individual but as a member of the German Delegation. He did not think that could be interpreted as pressure on us.

Mr. Manet switched to the Humphrey-Khrushchev talks and asked if Khrushchev had referred to his exchange with Eisenhower offering increased trade between the U.S. and the USSR. Mr. Kohler said he had not known about it until he had read it in the paper and Humphrey came in and reported. The subject of trade had come up. Mikoyan arranged for Senator Humphrey to see Trade Minister Kuzmin who gave the Senator an analysis of US-USSR trade by commodity since 1928 together with a list of available export goods. Khrushchev had stated that the VOA helps him a lot. He had written President Eisenhower about more consumers goods and he had said no via the VOA. He had actually wanted not consumers goods but machinery capable of making plastics which could be made into consumers goods or into chemicals and explosives, Mr. Kohler explained.

Mr. Manet said he did not want to be indiscreet but asked if there had really been anything important about the two "Secrets" Senator Humphrey had been told by Khrushchev. Mr. Kohler said they were not important - nothing our Intelligence Service did not know already. These were things Khrushchev hoped Humphrey would talk about. Mr. Manet remarked that there was nothing surprising about a missile with an 8,000 mile range - the important thing was accuracy.

Mr. Manet thanked Mr. Kohler for the appointment and promised to give him the revised paper mentioned earlier as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

copy rec'd in RM/R - destroyed

DECLASSIFIED	
NND 877418	
By	LV
NARS, Date 11/27/85	